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ABSTRACT 
A short introduction will be given to the Nordic project 
"NKA/INF: Information Technology for Accident and Emergency 
Management", which is now in its final phase. To perform 
evaluation of the project, special scenarios have been developed, 
and experiments based on these will be fulfilled and compared 
with experiments without use of the decision support system. 
Furthermore, the succeeding European project, "IT Support for 
Emergency Management - ISEM", with the purpose of developing a 
decision support system for complex and distributed decision 
making in emergency management in full scale, will be described 
and the preliminary conceptual model for the system will be 
presented. 
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'A 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an increasing potential for severe accidents as the 
industrial development tends towards large, centralised pro-
duction units. In several industries this has led to the 
formation of large organisations which are prepared for accident 
fighting and emergency management (EM). The functioning of these 
organisations critically depends upon efficient decision making 
and exchange of information. 
Experience has shown that operators may take precipitate action 
during the stress of an emergency situation. Based on detailed 
analysis of d.r' ",n_: and accidents at risky industrial plants, 
needs for and assessments of development of an on-site decision 
support system for operators and utilities have been unveiled. 
Similarly, full-scale emergency drills have been used to look 
into the flow of information between different participant? or 
organisational units within the off-site emergency organist tions 
to unveil needs, and assessments to support authorities in 
protection of people and environment in the vicinity of a risky 
industrial plant. 
The Nordic project is aimed at securing and possibly improving 
the functionality and efficiency of accident and emergency 
management by verifying, demonstrating, and validating the 
possible use of advanced information technology in the 
organisations mentioned above. 
Prototype systems covering limited parts of an accident and 
emergency situation have been developed to demonstrate the 
potential use of computer and communication systems, data base 
and knowledge base technology, and applications of methods used 
in artificial intelligence. 
The end product will be production of guidelines for the 
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introduction of advanced information technology in the 
organisations based on evaluation and validation of the prototype 
systems. 
Experience gained from these systems should decide as to what 
extent the use of information technology will be realistic, 
considering the time-, personnel-, and other resources that are 
to be spent in connection with developing a total preparedness 
system. 
The main objective of th« European project is to describe 
architectures and generate a set of accompanying software tools 
in relation to an integrated information system to support 
complex, dynamic, distributed decision making in large 
organisations, and to demonstrate the functionality of a full-
scale system for emergency management. 
Furthermore, the project will involve: 
The exploration, development, and description of 
architectures for decision support systems suited for 
emergency management of rare but severe events in large 
organisations. 
The development of tools supporting system specification and 
design, knowledge acquisition, system development, and 
maintenance throughout the full life cycle of the system. 
The design implementation, test, and evaluation of two 
demonstration systems. 
Demonstration of the operation and maintenance of the 
decision support system. 
Development of guidelines and strategies for the proper use 
of the project results in a variety of industrial 
sectors. 
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So, as the latter project may be seen as a successor to the first 
one, they differ in the sense that the Nordic project aims at 
demonstrating the validity of using modern information technology 
in emergency management, whereas the European project aims at 
developing an integrated information system in full-scale for 
emergency management in complex industrial establishments. 
NKA/INF; INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR 
ACCIDENT MID EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The development in time and the substance of the project may be 
found in reference 1. 
In the main phase a detailed scenario analysis has been performed 
together with a conceptual analysis of dynamic decision making. 
Great efforts have been put into the detailed study of the basic 
functions of information flow, in emphasising the most important 
centres - the County Emergency Organisation Centre (County EOC), 
the National Institute of Radiation Protection, and the National 
Power Inspectorate for the off-site organisation, Plant Emergency 
Manager for the on-site organisation - and in trying to identify 
the type of information transferred between different operational 
functions in the main centres, see Figure 1. From this analysis 
data and knowledge required to develop an effective decision 
support system have been specified. 
This has been performed for the off-site and on-site organisa-
tions separately, and has been presented in more detail in 
references 2 and 3. 
The aim of the project is not to develop a complete decision 
support system to cope with all aspects of emergency situations, 
but to develop prototype systems to support decision making in 
limited parts of emergency situations. 
In total, four different experiments will be performed based on 
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four different scenarios, two on-site and two off-site, and 
correspondingly, two prototype systems will be developed - one 
for on-site and one for off-site - to support decision making in 
these situations. The results obtained in using the prototype 
systems will be compared with drills using "normal" procedures to 
demonstrate the advantage of the system. All scenarios shall 
demonstrate detection, diagnosis, formation of plan of action, 
and execution. 
The experiments will provide us with material for empirical 
evaluation of the combined effect of the implementation strategy, 
the conceptual model for the developed part of the decision 
support system, and the use of data/knowledge bases. 
Evaluation of the Decision Support System 
Evaluation of a decision support system (DSS) may proceed along 
two lines. The first line involves an analytical evaluation, the 
second an empirical evaluation. 
The analytical evaluation may be seen as a normative theory that 
specifies the steps necessary for a good decision. The decision 
maker starts by implementing some plan, notices the consequences 
using the DSS, and evaluates them in t rms of expectations. 
Finally, a decision is made as to whether the result is 
acceptable or not, including the kinds of displays provided, and 
the knowledge required for understanding the displays. 
An empirical evaluation is desirable as well, as there are some 
aspects of the evaluation problem that cannot be solved analyti-
cally. 
Two main questions for an empirical evaluation are: 
- Will the DSS actually be used? 
- When the DSS is used, will the decision be better than when it 
is not used? 
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The first of these questions can only be evaluated in the context 
of a total system, where different systems compete for the deci-
sion maker's attention. This is outside the scope of the Nordic 
project, but will be valid for the European project. The second 
question may be answered for limited-part prototype systems, but 
for the evaluation to be beneficial, one should be careful not to 
involve systems or decisions not using the DSS which is being 
evaluated. 
In the empirical evaluation mainly two functions will be 
considered: 
- A message handling function, designed to help the user achieve 
a good overview of the status, and 
- A reminder function designed to ensure that all of the items in 
the emergency preparedness guide/plan are carried out. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the schematic set-up of the experiment and 
an example of the man-machine interface represented by a screen 
dump, respectively. 
The evaluation will be based on the quality of status reports 
produced by the persons carrying out the experiment and on the 
extent to which they actually carry out the items in the 
emergency preparedness guide/plan. Furthermore, the evaluation 
will be based on data on user satisfaction, unveiled by 
interviews of these persons after performing in a condition with 
the system and in a condition without the system. 
B8PRH2: IT SUPPORT FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT - ISEM 
For the time being only the first phase of the project concerning 
the conceptual model has been launched. Some preliminary ideas 
about the model will be given. 
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The definition of an industrial emergency management system is a 
system coping with situations involving a well defined source of 
accidents and a risk of release of toxic material to the environ-
ment. In this case the accident may - depending on the severity -
evolve from the given location into the total on-site area, the 
off-site local environment, the national environment, or even 
into the international environment. Concurrently with the 
evolvement of the accident, the organisation needed to cope with 
the accident will become active. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 
showing the development in time of the organisational set-up of 
emergency management in industrial plants. 
It is important to realise that the given organisational model is 
a generic model, which means that some of the boxes displayed in 
the model may - for a given application - be empty. Similarly, in 
other applications further boxes may be needed and added to give 
the full description of the actual organisation. 
We have found that the organisational set-up of emergency manage-
ment in process industries, exemplified, as in Figure 4, by 
nuclear power plants (NPPs), is characterised by 
- the goals involved: economic operation, plant integrity, and 
public protection, 
- the extent of authority involved concerning: on-site, off-
site, and national. 
In the following paragraphs these characteristics will be further 
elaborated: 
The goals: 
Stated at the top of the representation shown in Figure 4. 
The shaded areas of the horizontal goal bars represent the 
currently active goal. This does not mean that the overall 
importance of the goals changes in time; it means that relatively 
more resources and attention are required to secure the currently 
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active or the currently highest priority goal. So, for instance, 
protection of the public is of greater overall and long-teim 
importance than protection of a building of, e.g., a nuclear 
power plant. Nevertheless, at a given time during an emergency 
the NPP's emergency management organisation may be quite rational 
in devoting much greater effort to protecting the building -
merely because the goal of maintaining protection of the public 
is not threatened at that stage. 
The meaning of the distinction between passive and active 
protection of the public is the following: 
Passive protection is the situation in which the public is not 
actively involved, but is protected by actions of the emergency 
management organisation. 
In the active protection phase the public is actively involved 
by, e.g., orders to go inside, close their doors and windows, and 
listen to the radio. In a more severe situation the public will 
receive instructions for an evacuation. 
The reason for distinguishing between the active and the passive 
protection phases is that in the latter phase there is an 
enlarged risk of people reacting in a non-rational way. 
The extent of authority; 
Indicated on the vertical axis of the representation shown in 
Figure 4. 
As the legend explains, the double-lined boxes are the units that 
at a given stage have the responsibility and authority within 
their "area" - either on-site, off-site, or nationally. 
The following contains an illustration of the extent of authority 
combined with the escalation of activity among the units during a 
nuclear emergency, see Figure 4: 
In a normal situation the only active organisational unit is 
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the control room staff, and the goal to be focused upon is the 
economic operation of the plant. During normal operation the 
process will be watched constantly by monitoring specific 
critical parameters. 
- If one of the parameters indicates an abnormal situation, the 
shift supervisor may be called and the responsibility will be 
passed to him. If needed, further technical expertise and 
managerial support from the plant owners' organisation may be 
brought in from outside the plant. 
- If the situation evolves in an uncontrolled manner, a site 
emergency management will be organised for an on-site emergency 
situation. Furthermore, the off-site local EOC will be notified. 
This centre will be responsible for the local off-site situation, 
while the responsibility for the operations at the plant still 
rests with the technical management of the plant. During shift 
from one organisational set-up to the next, the goal to be 
focused upon may shift from economic operation to plant 
integrity. 
- If there is any risk of adverse consequences outside the plant 
as, for instance, toxic release, the emergency situation will 
change from site emergency to general emergency. In the general 
emergency situation the organisation will develop concurrently 
with the evolvement of the accident corresponding to the 
different columns in this phase. In this case the local EOC will 
build up an off-site organisation calling the necessary agents 
such as police, fire brigade, meteorological advisory service, 
etc. The first action of the local EOC will be to assess the 
current state of the plant as well as the local off-site 
environment, i.e., weather conditions, population distribution, 
etc. In this situation the goal to be focused upon will change 
from plant integrity to public protection - divided into passive 
and active protection, respectively, as explained above. 
- The last column of the organisational chart indicates the 
recovery phase where the shift in goals means the return from 
focusing on the highest goal via the next, ending with the 
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economic operation as the focused goal in the recovery situation. 
Identification of General and Specific Functions 
Each of the columns corresponds to a specific organisational set-
up or configuration. So, at each stage of the emergency (at each 
column of the organisational chart) the entire emergency 
organisation has to fulfil the following general functions (or 
••general tasks"): 
- Assessment of the current state and current prognosis for 
the plant/environment. 
- Assessment and possible revision of the current priority of 
overall goals (which goals require relatively more attention 
and resources now?). 
- Assessment of the need for additional actions and agents: 
the decision to alert additional agents or organisational 
units. 
- Establishment of communication links with units and agents. 
- Distribution of tasks and co-ordination of information 
needed to relevant units and agents. 
These general functions may be seen as methods for the entire 
present organisation to define specific functions for each part 
(unit) of the organisation. This means what at a given time the 
specific functions will support the fulfilment of the general 
functions. 
Furthermore, the general functions will be means to decide the 
shift from one level of activity to the next. Generally speaking, 
the decision that additional units/agents are needed means that 
the next column of the organisational chart is entered. This may 
shift the currently focused goal, and may shift the 
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responsibility to a new unit. 
Since the units and agents needed have been defined through these 
decisions, the next step is to supply them with the tasks and 
information to perform proper actions. The most important support 
offered by the emergency management organisation is the supply of 
relevant information to the relevant agents. Therefore, the next 
task is to establish communication links corresponding to the 
current organisational configuration. In doing this, it is 
necessary to discuss the information flow among the different 
units in the model at different levels of depth. 
Besides the communication tool, each organisation needs to have 
tools corresponding to the user requirement of the current 
situation. Such tools will be available from an application 
generator that will contain a set of tools to support functions 
needed in the actual situation. 
Information flow among different units in the model at different 
levels of depth as well as development of the framework of an 
application generator are items being considered carefully for 
the time being in the ISEM project, and will be reported at a 
later time, see reference 4. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is important to point out that the organisa-
tional model developed serves three purposes: First, it is 
intended to represent explicitly, when filled out in detail, the 
concrete emergency management organisational set-up and the 
escalation of emergency management activity for a particular 
plant. Second, it is intended to be used as a means of 
identifying the general and specific functions which each 
organisational unit must fulfil during an emergency. Third, it is 
intended to be used as a stepping stone towards representing the 
required flow of information among units at different stages of 
an emergency. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. The flow of infornation between on-site 
and off-site participants in an emergency 
situation. 
Figure 2. Schematic set-up of experiment. 
Figure 3. Example of screen dump. 
Figure 4. Organisational model in process industry. 
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